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S
RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY
IN THE USSR*
The last decade and a half has witnessed an extraordinary resurgence of
Russian nationalism in the USSR. Expressed first in literary, artistic, and
scholarly works and in the dissent of intellectuals, it soon became a mass
phenomenon, both welcomed and encouraged and at the same time carefully
monitored and curbed by portions of the political establishment. Unlike the
previous upsurge of Russian nationalism, that which occurred during World
War II and the immediate postwar years, this one was not initiated from above,
by the top leader or leadership, but from below, by discontented citizens and
concerned elites. Also unlike the Russian nationalism of Stalin's day, the
contemporary movement has to a significant extent been aimed at fundamentally
altering official policies and values.
It is the contention of this essay that this widespread, sustained
expression of intense Russian nationalist sentiment, the orientation of much
of this sentiment against the political and ideological status quo in the USSR,
and the high-level support which manifestations of this sentiment have received,
have major implications for the stability of the Soviet political system. After
indicating what is meant by the terms "political stability" and "nationalism,"
the essay will provide a brief chronological account of the Russian nationalist
movement. Drawing on the results of interviews with recent emigres, as well as
on samizdat and legally published Soviet sources, it will then survey and
analyze the major trends and groups in this exceedingly diverse movement and
discuss the destablilizing implications of the ideas the nationalists advocate.
In order to assess the political significance of the movement, the essay will
attempt to determine the degree of influence it has had and is likely to have. A
* I would like to acknowledge with thanks the extremely competent research
assistance I received from Ida Isaac of Tel-Aviv University.
2concluding section will relate the developments and phenomena analyzed to the
stability of the Soviet system in the future.
The Concept of Political Stability
Political stability is not a concept whose meaning has been widely
agreed upon or extensively discussed in the literature of political
science. I Moreover, the discussions which do exist tend to be of limited
value because they often fail to distinguish between the causes of stability,
the indicators of stability, the results of stability, and stability
itself. 2  However, what does seem to be common to most definitions of
stability and what, given the generic meaning of the term, should properly be
regarded as its essence, is continuity or persistence over time.3
Moreover, it is the persistence of order or structure, not of disorder or
anarchy, which is meant by stability. 4  A stable political system, in other
words, is one whose basic character or "critical components" persist for long
periods of time without fundamental alteration or are altered gradually,
without marked discontinuities.5 These components include the principal
political institutions, the basic laws and administrative structure, the
dominant political values or ideology, and the distribution of power among the
major political institutions and groups. A stable system is one which has
the capacity to absorb shocks and overcome crises without a breakdown in the
regime's capacity to govern or maintain order, and without a major alteration
in the character of the system resulting from such a breakdown. It is
therefore of necessity a system in which the regime is regarded as legitimate
by all politically significant groups. In a stable system pressures for
change are expressed in an orderly fashion, legally and peacefully, through
institutional structures, rather than violently, in violation of the law. 6
3In such a system demands for change generally are not aimed at the basic
character of the system. Demands for non-incremental or systemic change, if
made at all, are put forward only by politically insignificant social forces
7
or groups.
It is helpful to conceive of stability and instability as two ends of a
continuum. Any political system at a given point in time might, in theory,
be placed at some point on the continuum, closer to or farther from the pole
of stability. Destabilizing factors or forces are those which are likely to
move the system in the direction of instability, i.e., factors or forces which
tend to incite large-scale or frequent disorder, encourage expression of
radical demands for change on the part of significant social groups, or in
some other way lead to major, discontinuous systemic change. The presence of
destabilizing factors does not ipso facto imply that the system will undergo
sudden radical change. Whether it does depends on the relative strength of
thos factors vis-a-vis countervailing stabilizing factors.
The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism
Definitions of nationalism are many and varied and often quite
contentious.8 What is meant by the term in the context of this paper is
identification with and loyalty to one's national or ethnic group and the
desire to promote its interests as one perceives them. 9  This generally
implies either concern for the preservation of the group's existence and
identity (hence its culture and traditions) and/or interest in the expansion
of its influence, power, or prestige. A nationalist movement is a series of
actions to achieve one or more of these goals on the part of individuals or
groups who share them.
4The resurgence of Russian nationalism began in the mid-1960's and was
manifested almost immediately on four different levels; underground, in legal
literature and scholarship, among political elites, and in organizations with
official patronage. In 1964 a secret Russian nationalist revolutionary
organization, the All-Russia Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the
People (VSKhSON) was founded. 1 0  In 1965 the art historian and novelist
Vladimir Soloukin began to publish a seminal series of literary works
glorifying religious and cultural aspects of the pre-revolutionary Russian
past.1 1  Soloukhin's most famous and influential work, "Letters From the
Russian Museum," was published in the literary journal Molodaia gvardiia in
1966,12 and this journal soon became the principal mouthpiece of Russian
nationalist sentiment. The publication of Soloukhin's articles was followed
by the proliferation of scholarly works on Russian architecture, sculpture,
art, and iconography, as well as works by scholars designed to popularize and
arouse interest in Russia's cultural and religious heritage. In the same
year that Soloukhin began to publish works with nationalist themes, Valerii
Skurlatov, a high official in the Moscow Komsomol organization, distributed
among activists in the Central Committee and Moscow City Committee of the
Komsomol a document entitled "Rules of Morality." Glorifying "the Russian
race," this document spoke of "the cosmic mission of the Russian people" and
Russians' "duty to [their] ancestors" to preserve their racial purity. 1 4
The nascent Russian nationalist movement was greatly aided and encouraged by
the formation in 1966 of the All-Russia Society for the Preservation of
Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK), an officially sponsored, voluntary
"public" organization led by self-styled establishment "Russites."15 The
All-Russia Society for the Preservation of Nature and the Rossiia Literary
5Club, founded soon after, were likewise officially approved and controlled by
establishment Russian nationalists. 16
For a short while the movement was allowed to flourish on all four
levels without hindrance, the leadership uncertain or in disagreement on
whether to restrain it. Soon, however, curbs began to be imposed, first on
underground activity, then on the most extreme expressions of Russian
nationalism in legal publications. VSKhSON's founder, leader, and chief
ideologue was arrested in 1967 and his organization disbanded.1 7  The
Fetisov group, authors of a blatantly chauvinistic, anti-semitic program
glorifying the Slavic race, were arrested the following year.18 Molodaia
gvardiia was authoritatively condemned in 1970, its Chief Editor dismissed in
1971.19
After these restrictive moves, legal expressions of Russian nationalism
became more moderate, with individuals whose ideas were more overtly in
conflict with official ideology or values forced to express themselves in
samizdat and eventually silenced or sent abroad.20 Thus an essay entitled
"A Word to the Nation," whose plea to safeguard the purity of the Russian race
was very much in the spirit of Skurlatov's "Rules of Morality," could not be
circulated openly by 1971. It appeared in that year in samizdat, signed
anonymously by "Russian patriots."21 In the same year, a former VSKhSON
member, Vladimir Osipov, finding legal journals closed to him, created a
samizdat publication entitled Veche. Devoted to an ethical-religious brand
of Russian nationalism, Veche was suppressed three years later.
Solzhenitsyn's 1974 "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," which expressed grave
concern for the fate of the Russian people and urged that minority groups be
6allowed to secede from the USSR, was probably a primary cause of the author's
expulsion from the country in that year.22
What is most remarkable about these curbs on Russian nationalism,
however, is how limited their effect has been. Since its inception, the
movement has steadily gained momentum, acquiring larger and larger numbers of
supporters. Membership in VOOPIK reached 1 million a year after it was
founded and now exceeds 12 million.2 3  Suppression has only resulted in the
appearance of new groups and periodicals to replace the old. When Veche was
closed down, Osipov briefly published a new, more religiously oriented
journal, Zemlia, and when Osipov was arrested, still another samizdat
publication with a similar outlook, Moskovskii sbornik, appeared.
Religio-philosophical seminars and study groups with a Russian nationalist
orientation began to be organized in 1974 in Moscow, soon afterward in
Leningrad and Kiev. The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers'
Rights in the USSR was formed in 1976 with the aim of improving the status of
I
Russian Orthodoxy. A wave of arrests of Russian nationalists in 1979-80,
including the leaders of the Moscow Religio-Philosophical Seminar and the
Christian Committee, was followed by the organization of a Russian nationalist
Christian women's group, the Maria Club, in 1980.24
What is most important, Russian nationalist ideas, if articulated more
circumspectly and less stridently, are now expressed more and more openly and
more and more frequently in official forums. Neither Molodaia gvardiia
itself nor its Russian nationalist contributors have been silenced. The
number of journals which regularly print works with Russian nationalist themes
has grown steadily,25 and at least one mass circulation newspaper,
Sovetskaia Rossiia, can be characterized as a mouthpiece of the
7movement.26 Major newspapers such as Pravda and Literaturnaia gazeta
sometimes open their pages to nationalist contributors, and several large
publishing houses are known for their Russian nationalist orientation.2 7
The "ruralist" trend has had an increasing impact on Russian literature, and
is increasingly devoted to the issue of the physical and spiritual survival of
the Russian people.28  Russian nationalist art is exhibited to millions of
viewers in official galleries.2 9
Russian Nationalism and the Soviet Regime
For the purposes of this paper, the Russian nationalist movement may
usefully be depicted in terms of the relationship or distance between each of
its components and the Soviet regime. One can position the various groups or
groupings in the movement on a continuum, with those who are most opposed to
the regime and its values on one end and those with the closest links to the
political establishment on the other;
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9As can be seen from the above diagram, there are two principal
tendencies within the Russian nationalist movement. One is primarily
concerned about the spiritual well-being and physical survival of the Russian
people as a distinct ethnic group. It sees the Russian people as undergoing
a profound spiritual and demographic crisis because its values, culture, and
traditions are disappearing. It therefore seeks a revival of Russian
Orthodox religious values, Russian culture, and/or the traditional,
pre-industrial Russian way of life. The other tendency is primarily
concerned with preserving or enhancing the political and/or military power of
the Russian nation, vis-a-vis both other national groups within the USSR and
the rest of the world. This tendency generally regards the Soviet regime as
the actual or potential representative and protector of the Russian people and
is thus in favor of strengthening Soviet state power, both internally and
externally. Adherents of the first tendency are mostly to be found on the
upper portion of the above continuum, closer to the pole of opposition to the
regime, adherents of the second tendency on the lower portion. However, it
is important to note that there is by no means an absolute dichotomy between
the two tendencies; ideas characteristic of one are often articulated by
adherents of the other. Thus individuals and groups located near opposite
ends of the continuum have sometimes expressed very similar sentiments.
It is significant that among those nationalists closest to the pole of
opposition, only one group, the All-Russia Social-Christian Union for the
Liberation of the People (VSKhSON), was from the outset militantly opposed to
the regime and dedicated to its overthrow.30 Nearly all other nationalist
groups were at least initially interested in finding a modus vivendi with the
authorities. What is more important, nearly all, on the basis of their
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political experience, initially believed that their ideas could be acceptable,
even appealing to at least some portions of the political establishment.
Solzhenitsyn's first work with a clearly nationalist message was
addressed not to opponents of the regime, but to the Soviet leadership itself,
and its plea for more investment in the areas settled by Russians may, in
fact, have had an impact on official policy. 3 1  Only after his expulsion
from the USSR, when he edited the volume From Under the Rubble, did
Solzhenitsyn begin to express absolute, principled opposition to
Marxism-Leninism because of its godlessness. 3 2
Veche likewise began by proclaiming its loyalty to and support of the
"great Soviet power" and its opposition to the cosmopolitan human rights
movement. It defended the regime's foreign and nationality policies and
insisted (in an article by Chief Editor Osipov) on the importance of
maintaining Russian rule over the non-Russian areas of the USSR even though
they had been conquered by force.3 3  Only when Osipov found himself and his
journal increasingly harrassed and persecuted did he become persuaded that a
Russian cultural and religious renaissance would require substantial
liberalization of Soviet political life, including guarantees of
constitutional rights and freedoms. Only then did he establish links with
the human rights movement and become in his own eyes part of the illegal
34
opposition.
Osipov's commitment to a revival of Russian Orthodoxy and his stubborn
refusal to submit to official censorship implied of necessity that there would
be a certain tension between his journal and at least some portions of the
political establishment. Similarly, the various Russian Orthodox study
groups and clubs which have been organized outside the framework of the
11
officially sanctioned church have eventually found it necessary to operate
clandestinely. Dedicated to a reintroduction of religious values into the
lives of the Russian people and unwilling to limit themselves to publication
in official organs, they have been looked on with considerable suspicion by
the guardians of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. However, these groups have
generally refrained from adopting positions on political and ideological
issues. This is particularly true of the Christian Committee for the Defense
of Believers' Rights, which has made every effort to work within the system,
35
using exclusively legal methods and channels to assist believers.
More successful in finding a modus vivendi with the regime are the
36-
"ruralist" prose writers. Their primary concern is the fate of the
disappearing Russian village, which they regard as the repository of the
finest values and traditions of the Russian people, the source of their
spiritual strength and the key to their physical survival. This concern
appears to be either shared by or highly useful to very well-placed persons in
the political establishment.3 8  For this reason, these authors appear to
have no difficulty in publishing their work. Some, like Soloukhin, are
believed to have particularly close ties to the establishment. .Soloukhin and
the outspokenly nationalist artist Il'ia Glazunov are believed to have been
influential in persuading the authorities to accept the formation of the
Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments.3 9
Moving down the continuum, closer to the regime, one comes to a group of
writers and publicists who, while holding more controversial views, have made
even more strenuous efforts to achieve a modus vivendi with the authorities.
They have, in varying degrees, made it their objective either to justify
Russian nationalism in Communist terms or to justify Communist power in
12
Russian nationalist terms -- i.e., in terms of what the Soviet regime has
accomplished or can accomplish for the Russian people. For this reason they
have been described as "national bolsheviks." These include the members of
the Molodaia gvardiia group, the authors of the stridently nationalistic
essays for which the journal was officially reprimanded in 1970, and others
.. .40
who have written in the same vein.
Very close to the political establishment and in many cases well inside
it one finds a large assortment of writers, publicists, and officials whose
Russian nationalism expresses itself in the form of extreme chauvinism,
anti-semitism or general xenophobia, and/or fascism (the latter a combination
of racism and authoritarianism or neo-Stalinism). The "Rules of Morality"
circulated by Komsomol official V. Skurlatov represented this tendency, as
do the writings of Russian nationalist theoretician Petr Palievskii and the
anti-semitic diatribes of Central Committee researcher Iurii Ivanov,
official propagandists Vladimir Vagon and Evgenii Avasaev, and literary
critic Vadim Kozhinov. 4 1
Within the political establishment there are also numerous relatively
moderate Russian nationalists in whom Russian and Soviet patriotism often tend
to merge. Most of them subscribe to no coherent doctrine. However, they
make it their business to provide patronage, support and official protection
to Russian nationalists of all kinds, particularly those who would enhance
Russia's political and military might.
13
Russian Nationalism and Political Stability
Russian Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism
In some sense the sheer existence of a Russian nationalist movement with
broad appeal among the Russian masses (up to now chiefly urban youth),
intelligentsia, and political elite is itself an indicator of serious
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instability in the Soviet political system. For however close the ties
between certain nationalists and the political establishment, however hard
some of them have labored to achieve an ideological and political modus
vivendi with the regime, there is an inescapable contradiction between some of
the basic tenets of Russian nationalism (indeed, of any brand of nationalism)
and Marxism-Leninism. The very fact that the essence of nationalism is
concern for the preservation and well-being of a single nation places it in
opposition to the internationalist or supranationalist orientation of
Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism can make no more than a temporary,
pragmatic alliance with nationalism; ultimately it seeks to overcome and
eradicate it. Whatever their private sentiments may be, the Soviet leaders
have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to internationalism, i.e., to the
well-being of all working people, on an equal basis, regardless of
nationality, and to the eradication of national differences. 4 4  This
commitment and the progress they can cite toward achieving it are among the
most important justifications they claim, both for the existence of the Soviet
45
system and, in effect, for Russian rule over non-Russians. The very
fact, then, that there is a widely held body of sentiment which rejects
internationalism and posits the interests and future of one nation as its
central concern is a sign that one of the most basic, system-legitimizing
14
values in Soviet political life is being rejected and hence that the system
contains a significant element of instability. 46
In this context it is particularly important to emphasize that, as the
previous section of this essay made clear, Russian nationalism is not by any
means a movement composed exclusively of dissidents, of individuals far
removed from and without hope of influencing the political establishment. An
astute observer of the Soviet political system has stated that political
stability in the USSR is to a significant degree contingent upon community of
47
assumptions or worldview among political and other elites. This
community or unity has been essential in making the Party impervious to
political opposition, in insuring continuity of doctrine and basic policy
direction, and in sustaining popular acceptance of and support for Party
rule. The spontaneous resurgence of Russian nationalism among the political
elite, part of which remains strongly internationalist in its orientation, has
already done a great deal to shatter this unity, dissolve this community, and
hence to destroy one of the main sources of political stability in the USSR.
The contradiction between Russian nationalism and official ideology, the
challenge Russian nationalism presents to official political values and basic
systemic tenets and hence its threat to systemic stability, becomes even
clearer when one considers the fact that a substantial portion of the Russian
nationalist movement specifically and in some cases quite explicitly denounces
Marxism-Leninism and its central doctrines or objectives, Of course this is
more true of those whom the regime has persecuted -- VSKhSON, Solzhenitsyn and
his circle, some contributors to Veche. However, even many of the "legal"
Russian nationalists view Marxism-Leninism as an alien import which has done
more harm than good to the Russian people. Many -- both dissidents and
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"legals" -- seek an alternative source of values, which they tend to find in
the pre-revolutionary, pre-industrial past and in religion. Rejecting the
official doctrine that it was the October Revolution and the radical
transformation it accomplished which brought salvation to an oppressed Russia,
they seek to preserve as much continuity as possible between the way of life
of the Russian people in the present and that of their ancestors in the
past. Some openly praise the Tsarist regime; others denigrate the notion of
class struggle in Russian society, lauding the so-called reactionary elements
in pre-revolutionary Russia or denouncing collectivization and the destruction
of the Russian peasantry which accompanied it. Many explicitly oppose
both industrialization and scientific and technical progress, the two goals
which, along with socialism itself, constitute the central objective and ideal
of Marxism-Leninism. 49 Industrialization, they claim, destroyed the
Russian village and the values and culture it nurtured. The scientific and
technological revolution has left a spiritual vacuum, which official ideology
has not filled.50 The urbanization which industrialization and scientific
and technological progress have fostered has had a devastating effect on
Russian fertility, threatening the very existence of the Russian people.51
Above all, many Russian nationalists, even many closely linked to the
establishment, seek to return the Russian people to their traditional
religion, which they see as the spiritual foundation of the nation.52 They
strongly condemn Marxism-Leninism's hostility to religion and plead for a much
greater role for the Orthodox Church in Russian society. 53 This is indeed
quite fundamental dissent, reflecting the existence of forces which are not
reconciled to basic values of the system.
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If the resurgence of Russian nationalism is in itself a sign of
instability in the Soviet political system, the movement also contains the
potential for generating further, more serious instability. Its
destabilizing effects may arise from its impact on both Russians and,
indirectly, on non-Russians. Let us consider the latter group first.
Russian Nationalism and the Non-Russians
To anyone who makes a comparative survey of the political situation in
the numerous multi-ethnic states which exist in the world today it is
immediately apparent that the USSR has been quite successful in containing and
alleviating ethnic tensions. In particular, by contemporary international
standards, there is in the USSR relatively little minority protest, especially
violent protest, against the ethnic majority and the system dominated and
imposed by it.
There are a number of reasons for this. Very probably one of the most
salient is the nature of Soviet nationality policy and practices up to now.
Indeed, it may be argued that official nationality policy and practices,
although unable finally to "solve" the nationality problem, have nonetheless
constituted one of the key stabilizing forces in the Soviet political
system. The official commitment to the equality of all national groups which
54
was discussed above has been one important component of that policy.
Another has been the care taken by the regime throughout most of its history
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to condemn and restrain Russian nationalism. The Soviet leaders have
been extremely sensitive to the danger posed by Great Russian chauvinism, its
potential for disrupting the frangible multinational edifice on which the
Soviet system rests.5 6  Hence they have firmly denounced such chauvinism
and to some extent have even denied the Russian people some of the official
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recognition and opportunities for national self-expression extended to other
ethnic groups in the USSR.57 Most important, the Soviets have carefully
pursued what might be described as a concessionary and compensatory
nationality policy. While they have allowed the non-Russian peoples little
autonomy in handling political and economic affairs and have vigorously
suppressed overt expression of nationalism on the part of non-Russians, they
have granted the minority nationalities a very considerable degree of
administrative autonomy and extensive opportunities to develop their own
58
cultures and employ their own languages. Moreover, although they have
given most non-Russian nationalities little opportunity to participate in the
governance of the USSR, they have accorded the largest of the minority groups,
the Ukrainians, a very significant role in ruling and administering the
country.59 In addition, they have compensated the non-Russians generally
with extensive symbolic representation at the center and with very substantial
economic benefits. 0
It is the possibility that the rise of Russian nationalism may
substantially alter this carefully devised and pursued nationality policy
that, above all, renders the movement a significant threat to political
stability in the USSR. Such a situation might come about in a number of
ways. In the first place, should the regime simply appear to endorse' the
extreme racist and chauvinist views of some of the Russian nationalists, this
would be a major deviation from previous policy and would, in and of itself,
be highly provocative to the non-Russian peoples.
It is true that the most blatant expression of Russian nationalist
racism up to now was published illegally in samizdat. This was a
denunciation of "random hybridization" of the races in the USSR on the grounds
18
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that it would lead to the biological degeneration of the Russian nation.
However, the official press has echoed such sentiments. A contributor to the
journal Voprosy istorii approvingly discussed the views of Russian scholar
L.M. Gumilev, who argued that since ethnically mixed marriages result in
genetically inferior offspring, and hence in inferior states and social
institutions, intermarriage between Russians and others would lead to national
self-destruction.62 Moreover, it was a high Komsomol official who
circulated a manifesto demanding sterilization of Russian women who "give
themselves to foreigners." 63
Equally provocative to the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR are
Russian nationalist paeans to the greatness of the Russian people, their
"healthy" civilization, and their superior national spirit or soul, some of
which have likewise appeared in the official press.64 It is not only
VSKhSON members and other dissidents, but a well-known literary critic with
excellent establishment connections, speaking openly at an officially
sponsored seminar, who has insisted that the Russian people have a special
exalted mission, a unique 1word to say" to all other peoples.65 If the
chauvinism and xenophobia expressed in Veche are more extreme than what
appears in works which pass the censor, Molodaia gvardiia, Moskva, and other
organs of the official press are known for their fierce anti-semitism and
hostility to non-Russians generally, especially Soviet Asiatics and other
non-Slavs. References to Russia as the "first among equals" among the nations
of the USSR are becoming more and more frequent in the mass media, and
history lessons in non-Russian schools apparently are increasingly stressing
the contributions made by Russians to the development of the USSR and
belittling by their silence those made by non-Russians.6 6
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Expression of views of this sort has already had significant political
consequences. Knowledgeable observers claim it has played a major role in
triggering and intensifying outbursts of minority nationalism.6 7
Apparently it has generated considerable inter-ethnic tension in the Soviet
armed forces. 68 If the authorities allow arrogant sentiments like these to
be articulated more often in official forums and in so doing become
increasingly identified with Russian nationalist ideas, the resentment which
at present is directed primarily against Russians themselves will more and
more be turned against the regime and the system.
Should Russian nationalist views have a direct impact on policy, the
political consequences are likely to be even more serious. Consider, for
example, nationalist demands that the regime permit a revival of the Russian
cultural, religious and military-patriotic heritage. To a certain extent,
these demands have already had an impact; they resulted in the creation of
the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, whose
members visit museums to view Russian artistic treasures, help to restore
icons, and take trips to important Russian battlefields, all under official
auspices. The more the regime indulges demands of this sort, however, the
more it will create for itself an acute political problem. The more it gives
free reign to the cultural, religious, and historical quest of the Russian
nationalists, the more it will find itself pressed to be equally tolerant of
minority nationalisms expressed in similar quests. But this it has been and
is likely to be most loath to do.
Even if the tenets of Russian nationalism contradict those of
Marxism-Leninism, on a practical level most Russian nationalists have been
supportive of the Soviet state and system or have at least sought and usually
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achieved a modus vivendi with them. The same is not true of most minority
nationalism, however. Efforts to revive and develop Russian culture have
been efforts to promote a culture which has always been the dominant one in
the USSR, a culture which the regime has urged non-Russians to adopt as their
own -- a culture the dissemination of which has been highly useful to the
regime as an instrument of political integration and domination. Thus such
efforts, while contradictory to official ideology, have not generally been
directed against official policy. Similarly, interest in Russian Orthodoxy
is interest in a religion which is the cradle of the dominant culture and a
religion which has actively cooperated with and supported the Soviet state.
Hence the regime has not always found such interest objectionable. In
contrast, efforts to revive and develop minority cultures and religions have
usually been directed against the Russifying thrust of official policy.
Similarly, celebration of the deeds of Russian heroes -- of explorers and
generals who helped the Russian empire expand -- has implied approval of the
perpetuation of that empire. Praise for non-Russian military and political
figures, on the other hand, has generally implied praise for resistance to
Russian domination and advocacy of a major change in the political status
quo. Such praise, therefore, has been and is likely to be regarded as
politically subversive and hence unacceptable.
Thus the more the regime indulges Russian nationalism and its search for
spiritual roots and historical continuity, the more it will establish a double
standard. The activities of the Russian nationalists are likely to become a
model for non-Russians, but their aspirations to imitate the model will be
repressed. Such discrimination among nationalisms in favor of the Russian
variety will undoubtedly arouse intense resentment against the regime on the
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part of non-Russians. Indeed, it has already become a major issue, capable
of arousing strong passions, in the increasingly assertive dissent of minority
nationalists.6 9 Such resentment and such passions do not augur well for
political stability in the USSR.
Still more potentially inimical to political stability is the
possibility that the regime might abandon its compensatory and concessionary
nationality policy in response to Russian nationalist pressure. If the
demands made by Russian nationalists are heeded, the political strength of the
Russians would be significantly increased at the expense of the
70
non-Russians. This would undoubtedly mean that the politically crucial
Russian-Ukrainian partnership in ruling the country would be dissolved or
greatly attenuated. It would probably also mean that even the limited, yet
symbolically significant, non-Russian presence at the center of the political
system would be noticeably reduced.
Equally serious, Russian nationalist influence on policy would very
probably result in a major reduction in the economic benefits enjoyed by the
non-Russians. There are three possibilities in this regard. One current of
thought within the Russian nationalist movement favors a drastic decrease in
the pace of economic growth in the USSR. Those who take this position argue
that a high level of economic growth can only be sustained at the expense of
Russian interests, since it is only or primarily Russians who constitute a
suitable labor force for industrial development. Thus it is Russians,
already the most urbanized of the major nationalities, who would be taken from
their native villages and resettled in large industrial centers. This would
have (as it already has had) a drastic effect on their culture, their values,
and their fertility -- i.e., on their identity and survival as an ethnic
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group. 7 1 If the regime were to comply with the demands of the nationalists
who argue in these terms, the living standards of all Soviet citizens would
decline or cease to improve, and non-Russians would surely feel the pinch as
much or more than Russians. Alternatively, there is another school of
thought within the movement which sees a major increase in Soviet military
might, accompanied by a more forcible and expansionist foreign policy, as
redounding to the glory of the Russian people. 7 2  Their program would
inevitably result in a major shift of resources away from consumption into the
military sector. As with the case of a low-growth policy, the living
standards of all citizens would be negatively affected, those of non-Russians
as much or more than those of Russians. Moreover, if some Russian
nationalists had their way, there would be a significant transfer of resources
from Russians to non-Russians. A higher proportion of well-paying jobs in
the non-Russian republics would be preserved for Russians, - and there would
be a major shift in the allocation of investment and consumption resources
from non-Russian to Russian areas. Official efforts to reduce economic
disparities among the national groups and republics would be ended, and
special efforts would be made to develop Russian agriculture and improve the
living conditions of the Russian peasants. 7 4
There could be no better recipe for vastly increasing existing tensions
between Russians and non-Russians in the USSR than a political and economic
program of this sort. The lack of positions open to non-Russians in the
Party and state apparatus is already an important grievance of minority
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elites. The perceived prosperity of Russians relative to non-Russians is
likewise already widely resented. As it is, many non-Russians believe that
the Russians are exploiting them. Ukrainians, Georgians, Estonians,
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Latvians, and Lithuanians have tried to demonstrate to the regime that their
republics contribute more to the central budget than they receive.76
Central Asians have demanded large transfers of resources, particularly water,
from the RSFSR to their regions. There are increasing signs of conflict
between Russians and other groups over economic development funds.I
8  Such
conflicts are likely to intensify even if there is no change in present
allocation policy, since both the need for resources on the part of some of
the major non-Russian populations and expectations that the need will be
fulfilled have been growing rapidly. (It has been pointed out that the
extraordinarily high birthrate among Central Asians means that enormous
capital expenditures will be required in the coming decades simply to clothe,
feed, house and employ these peoples at current levels. At the same time,
the past efforts of the Soviet leadership to equalize regional development and
provide jobs for native cadres have generated a revolution of rising
expectations among both masses and elites. ) Up to now the regime has
been able to justify its failure to achieve its stated goal of equal
development on economic and military grounds. These justifications are
likely to seem far less compelling in the future. They will thus be of
little avail in persuading non-Russians to accept less-than-equal benefits.
At present the struggle for consumption and investment funds from the
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center is waged more among republics than against the center. ' Should the
rise of the Russian nationalist movement result in a policy which blatantly
favors Russians and the RSFSR over all other ethnic groups and areas, one can
expect that this would unite non-Russians against the regime which implemented
such a policy. For this reason the tensions which would be generated by
abandoning the compensatory policies now pursued would have most serious
24
consequences for the Soviet regime and system. Even if those policies have
up to now been implemented only to a limited degree, even if they represent
intention and public commitment more than fulfillment, a change in the status
quo would be extremely destabilizing.
Similarly likely to generate such tensions and hence similarly
potentially destabilizing would be a move on the part of the regime to
withdraw or substantially reduce the concessions it now makes to minority
aspirations for autonomy. There is a strong tendency within the Russian
nationalist movement which wants the Soviet state to adopt a more repressive
approach to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Adherents of this tendency
desire a more powerful, centralized state, which will facilitate greater
Russian control over non-Russian areas. They admire the expansionist,
imperialist policy of the pre-revolutionary Russian state and urge its Soviet
successor to impose similarly undiluted Russian rule on the non-Russian
subjects of the empire. Some even seem to be critical of Soviet
federalism, which they would prefer to replace with a unitary Soviet state
dominated by Russians. Others call for the incorporation into the RSFSR
of other republics which have large Russian populations -- Kazakhs tan, the
Ukraine, the Tartar and Bashkir ASSR's, Karelia. At the very least,
these Russian nationalists are determined to preserve the Russian empire
intact and would firmly repress what one of them calls the "zoological
nationalisms of the borderlands" which endanger the unity of the USSR.85
Nationalists of this ilk are highly enthusiastic about Russian colonization of
non-Russian areas of the USSR and view the natives who oppose it as
"hotheaded" and reactionary. Some are likewise eager to see the
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non-Russian peoples thoroughly Russified, although they do not generally favor
intermarriage. 87
Some adherents of this "statist" tendency would deprive the non-Russians
not only of much of the administrative, cultural, and linguistic autonomy they
now possess, but also of much of the liberty accorded them in the post-Stalin
era. Most of the nationalists who favor expansion of Russian control and
influence over non-Russians are also neo-Stalinists who favor the use of force
and terror to repress minority resistance to their program. 88
There can be no doubt that if ideas such as these were to influence
official policy, the result would be highly explosive and the stability of the
Soviet political system would be very seriously jeopardized. If the
compensatory aspects of Soviet nationality policy even now are deemed
inadequate by many non-Russians, the concessions now granted to minority
aspirations for self-determination are widely regarded as even less
satisfactory (albeit not insignificant). Centralization of political and
economic decision-making is already a major grievance of non-Russian elites,
who feel that they and their interests are inadequately represented. Lack of
political autonomy is likewise widely resented by minority elites. The very
compensations already accorded these elites -- the extensive opportunities for
educational advancement and training -- will in the future render more and
more of them increasingly capable of administering the affairs of their
republics on their own and hence increasingly discontent with the constraints
placed upon them. Already some of these elites have begun to call for very
substantial political change. Forty prominent Estonian intellectuals wrote
an open letter to Pravda in October, 1980, for example, demanding that the
Estonian people be granted "the final word on the destiny of their land and
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people." If the degree of autonomy accorded non-Russians is
significantly reduced, one can expect to hear similar and even more radical
demands voiced more and more frequently.
Russian settlement outside the RSFSR is also a highly sensitive
political issue. Present levels of Russian immigration from the RSFSR into
non-Russian areas have resulted in major anti-Russian riots and mass
demonstrations. On a number of occasions thousands of citizens have marched
in the major cities of Central Asia and the Baltic states, demanding that the
Russians leave their republics. In some instances the demonstrations were so
violent they have to be put down by Russian troops. 90 Even high-level
officials with much to gain by cooperating with the central authorities have
begun openly to complain about the influx of Russians into their
regions.91 There is every reason to expect that minority resistance to any
significant increase in the scale of Russian colonization would be even more
massive and difficult to control.
The picture is similar with regard to Russification. Even present
policies, involving not only tolerance of native cultures and language use,
but also expenditure of large sums on promotion of non-Russian literature,
art, and language instruction, are deemed insufficient by many non-Russians.
Recent efforts by the regime to expand Russian language instruction and
somewhat curtail the use of local languages have caused thousands to sign
petitions and take to the streets in angry protest.92 Even the symbols of
Russian domination (as opposed to the substance) have been the targets of
non-Russian violence.
Should official policy come to be guided by Russian nationalist views,
one could expect that protest of this sort would be very greatly
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intensified. Demands for major systemic change would surely be voiced with
great frequency, as the non-Russian peoples became convinced that a one-party
police state with a highly centralized economy and administrative structure
dominated by Russians could never meet their needs or serve their interests.
The amount of anti-regime violence would probably escalate significantly as
increasingly confident, nationally conscious elites began to give political
direction to what previously had been periodic anomic upsurges in anti-Russian
sentiment. A repressive response to such protest, which would be very likely
on the part of a regime swayed by Russian nationalism, would probably only
incite more violence and more widespread demands for systemic change.
Should a process of this sort be set in motion, one might well begin to
see extensive non-cooperation with the authorities on the part of
non-Russians, both masses and elites. Since non-Russians are playing a
steadily increasing role in the Soviet labor force generally and in the
scientific and technical workforce in particular, this would probably result
in a substantial decline in productivity and hence in a significant reduction
in economic growth. The use of non-rational or non-economic criteria in the
allocation of investment in response to Russian nationalist demands would
probably have the same effect. The work of Soviet economists indicates, for
example, that the country's agriculture will suffer very greatly should
Russian nationalists succeed in preventing redirection of Russian rivers to
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supply Central Asia with water. Should Russian nationalist pressure lead
the regime to avoid major investments in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the
regions in which the main bulk of new recruits into the labor force will be
located in the coming decades, Soviet industrial performance may likewise be
quite adversely affected. A generally worsening economic situation resulting
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from these factors would be likely to deepen minority discontent and thus
intensify the destabilizing impact of Russian nationalism on the Soviet
political system. 9 5
Russian Nationalism and the Russians
The destabilizing effects of the rise of Russian nationalism are likely
to be felt primarily through the impact of the movement on official policy and
non-Russian reactions to that policy. But it could also have an impact on
the stability of the Soviet political system through its influence on the
thoughts, feelings, and behavior of the Russian population of the USSR.
Let us remember, first of all, that portions of the Russian nationalist
movement are highly critical of the Soviet system. They condemn it and its
leaders for having destroyed the basis of Russian identity and sacrificed the
Russian nation in their drive for economic and military power and societal
reconstruction. If repeated often enough, this criticism could help to
undermine the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of many Russians. Should
this occur, it would be of enormous political significance, since it is the
Russians' acceptance of and support for the Soviet system which have
constituted one of the most important stabilizing factors in Soviet political
life. A weakening of the system's legitimacy among Russians would be more
likely to occur if the Russian nationalist movement is frustrated in its
efforts to influence policy and many Russians come to see the regime as
highly unsympathetic to their needs and interests. Hence, paradoxically,
even if the movement is a political failure, it may be a significant
destabilizing force.
In addition, should the rise of Russian nationalism not only increase
Russian self-awareness, but also encourage Russian arrogance, chauvinism, and
hostility toward non-Russians, the consequences for the stability of the
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Soviet political system could be most serious. High-handedness on the part of
Russian officials toward non-Russians is already a widespread and deeply
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resented phenomenon. Incidents of Russian violence against non-Russians
are likewise even now not infrequent.9 The spread of Russian nationalist
ideas about Russian superiority and entitlement to greater economic benefits
could encourage both sorts of behavior, as could Russian nationalist
xenophobia and calls for repression of minority nationalism. By inciting
Russians against non-Russians, Russian nationalism could help to make life in
the USSR intolerable for the latter. The probable result would be similar to
the consequences likely to flow from Russian nationalist influence on official
policy; radical political protest by the minorities and large-scale minority
violence directed against the regime which tolerated such behavior. In the
coming decades the need either to locate a considerable portion of new
industry in labor-rich Central Asia and Transcaucasia or to send Central
Asians and Transcaucasians to industrial sites in the RSFSR is likely to
result in significantly more contact between Russians and non-Russians than
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now exists. This will render the potentially destabilizing impact of
Russian nationalism all the greater.
Russian Nationalism; A Stabilizing Force?
A discussion of the potential impact of Russian nationalism on the
stability of the Soviet political system should not ignore the fact that the
movement is by no means united on all important issues. If some of the ideas
voiced by certain Russian nationalists were to become the basis of policy,
they would probably tend to increase support for the regime and system among
minority groups. Some nationalists, for example, oppose Russian settlement
outside the RSFSR on the grounds that the dispersion of the Russian people
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will lead to its disintegration and ultimate extinction as a distinct ethnic
group. Russians, they argue, should reconverge on the Russian Republic,
where they would become a more compact ethnic group and would be able to
develop greater self-consciousness as a nation.99 Similarly, there are
Russian nationalists who advocate political and economic
decentralization, 100and others favor universal guarantees of freedom of
expression and religious worship. Some explicitly stress that every
ethnic group should have the right to cultivate and express its unique values
and identity.102 Most significantly, there are even Russian nationalists
who believe the Russian rule over non-Russians is imprudent or immoral and
gravely threatens Russian cohesion and self-preservation. They would allow
most minority groups to secede from the USSR so that a truly Russian state,
ruled exclusively by and for Russians, could be established.l0 3
It is unlikely, however, that views such as these could ever influence
official policy. In the first place, they are expressed by only a tiny
handful of members of the movement, most of whom are now in exile and all of
whom are located on the uppermost part of the Russian nationalist continuum
presented earlier. That is, these are nationalists who could not achieve a
modus vivendi with the regime because their ideas constitute a direct
challenge to the three most central principles of Soviet political practice;
Party rule, Russian political dominance, and the power of the Soviet state.
At most these nationalists -- former VSKhSON members, Solzhenitsyn and his
circle, Osipov and some Veche contributors -- could have an effect through
their impact on the thought and behavior of Russians themselves. Their ideas
could help to discourage Russian arrogance and chauvinism and thereby aid in
the reduction of interethnic tension and minority resentment of Russian
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rule. It would appear that at least one representative of this
"coexistential" trend in Russian nationalism has indeed exerted considerable
influence on certain segments of the Russian intelligentsia. This is, of
course, Solzhenitsyn. However, there is little indication that
Solzhenitsyn's ideas appeal to the Russian masses, and it is by and large his
interest in reviving Russian culture, religion, and village life -- not his
political views or attitudes toward non-Russians -- which have gained
currency among Russian intellectuals. Thus although in theory the
"coexistentialists" could have a stabilizing impact on Soviet political life,
in fact it is unlikely they will do so.
Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics
We have seen that the dominant trend in Russian nationalism constitutes
a destabilizing force primarily because of its potential for rousing the non-
Russian population against the regime should that trend succeed in influenc-
ing official policy. The importance of this force thus depends to a signifi-
cant extent on the likelihood that it will indeed have an impact on policy.
How can we gauge that likelihood? Two lines of inquiry or sets of questions
suggest themselves. First, what indications are there (if any) that Russian
nationalism has already found sympathy at the top; what has been the stance
of the regime toward those Russian nationalist ideas and demands which have
provoked and are likely to provoke non-Russian discontent? Second, how
influential is this more provocative trend in Russian nationalism within the
political establishment; how likely is it that the new leadership will be
swayed by or compelled to make concessions to it?
The Soviet Regime and Russian Nationalism
The new General Secretary has not yet given much indication of his views
regarding Russian nationalism.104 Nor has the new regime taken distinctive
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policy initiatives which clearly reveal its position on this subject. At
this juncture, therefore, any analysis of the impact of Russian nationalism
on top-level thinking and decision-making must focus on the Brezhnev regime,
during whose tenure the movement's resurgence occurred.
The position of the Brezhnev regime and of Brezhnev himself toward
Russian nationalism was highly complex and more than a little ambiguous. It
appears that there were considerable differences of opinion on this matter
within the Politburo.105 With regard to Brezhnev personally, some believe
that he was himself a Russian nationalist,106 others that he was a firm
opponent of Russian nationalism,107 and still others that he has found it
necessary or desirable to tolerate the Russian nationalists, to concede to
them, and/or to cooperate with them and lend them his support.108 Finally,
there are those who argue that he has found it useful to take a centrist
position between the Russian nationalists and their opponents, balancing off
the two groups against one another.109 In fact, there is probably some truth
in each of these interpretations.
There is certainly evidence that the regime as a whole and Brezhnev in
particular regarded certain manifestations of Russian nationalism as quite
dangerous and thus firmly opposed them. Attempts to evade Party control in
order to express Russian nationalist ideas were invariably suppressed:
publication in samizdat or abroad, formation of groups or committees without
official approval or supervision, organization of religious observance or
study outside the aegis of the official church. There were also certain
Russian nationalist views which, when expressed too explicitly and stridently
in an official forum, were pronounced unacceptable. A series of articles
which appeared in Molodaia gvardiia between 1968 and 1970 were condemned
by Brezhnev personally at a special Politburo session in the fall of
1970.110 An authoritative article in Kommunist, published soon after, indi-
cated that their non-Marxist approach to pre-revolutionary Russian history
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(an approach which diminished the significance of the Revolution and the
achievements of the Party), their blatant chauvinism (which could antagonize
non-Russians), and their manifest neo-Stalinism (which could lead to a revival
of personal dictatorship and large-scale terror) were what made them unaccept-
able. il Brezhnev emphasized, too, that their extremely positive assessment
of the role of religion in Russian society -- their attempt in effect to pro-
pose that Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church serve as the main
source of inspiration and values to contemporary Russians -- was intolerable. 1 1 2
What the regime's move against Molodaia gvardiia did not make clear,
however, was whether it was the ideas expressed in its pages, the extremely
strident and explicit form in which they were expressed, or the expression of
them in a journal known for its close ties to the establishment, which rendered
them beyond the pale. Official policy after 1970 indicated that the attempt to
rediscover, revive, and rehabilitate even the most reactionary aspects of the
Russian past would be acceptable if it were carried out in ways which were not
excessively provocative. Assertion of Russian distinctiveness and uniqueness,
commendation of Stalin's methods of rule, and praise for Russian Orthodoxy as
an institution and source of values would likewise be permissible if expressed
discreetly, with restraint, and in forums which did not seem to indicate that
these ideas reflected the position of the regime. Instead of speaking in glow-
ing terms about specific Russian heroes who contributed to Russian expansion at
the expense of non-Russians, nationalist writers learned they must confine
themselves to abstract generalizations about the need "to preserve what was
positive in the historical past."ll3 They must not openly extol the deeds of
the Tsars, but they might indirectly commend "faithful service to the Tsar and
Fatherland" and praise the "positive historical role" played by the Russian
princes in the formation of the Russian state.114 They could not condemn the
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Revolution, but they could describe the period of Ancient Rus as a
uniquely heroic time, in which the contemporary moral ideal of the
Russian people was formed.115 Russian nationalist writers could not glorify
the Russian national soul, but they could speak admiringly of the special
"spiritual values acquired by the [Russian] people in their thousand-year
history.',116 They must not defend the terror of the 1930's, but they might
insist on Stalin's greatness and justify nearly every other aspect of his
rule.117 Similarly, they must not present Russian Orthodoxy as the basis of
the spiritual strength of the Russian people, but they might quietly suggest
that modern Russian society suffers because the influence of the Church has
declined.ll8 Russian nationalists were free, in other words, to make their
ideas heard, so long as they did so in moderation and in legally approved
forums, yet without the appearance of speaking for the regime.
To insure that these ideas did not seem to represent the dominant line
or policy of the Party, the regime saw to it that they were periodically
criticized.119 Brezhnev himself was among the critics.120 However,
extremely zealous criticism of the nationalists was proscribed along with
extremely zealous nationalism. Thus when the Acting Head of the Propaganda
Department of the Central Committee, Aleksandr Iakovlev, followed up the
Kommunist critique of Molodaia gvardiia with a much stronger, far more
thorough and detailed condemnation of the offending articles and others like
them, he had great difficulty publishing this piece. When it finally
appeared after almost a year had passed, Iakovlev was dismissed from his post
and sent off to Canada to take up the considerably less prestigious and less
powerful position of Soviet Ambassador there.121 This suggests that at
least some portion of the leadership, perhaps Brezhnev himself, was either
sympathetic to the nationalists or found it politically useful to see to it
that they were allowed to express their views.
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Moreover, throughout the last decade the Brezhnev regime made many
concessions to Russian national pride and ethnic feeling. Indeed, it seems
to have been attempting to coopt Russian nationalism and manipulate it for its
own purposes. In contrast to its predecessor, this regime not only did not
oppose the formatia of voluntary societies for the preservation of Russian
historical and cultural monuments, it provided them with official
recognition and sponsorship.122 It revived the Stalinist modus vivendi
with the Russian Orthodox Church which Khrushchev's aggressive anti-religious
campaign had largely shattered. Tolerance of the Churchwas explicitly urged
in the press, 123 and the government devoted considerable effort to the
regilding and remounting of Church crosses. Prestigious official facilities
were granted for the performance of drama and the exhibition of works of art
with Russian nationalist themes.124 Russian nationalist symbols and images
also frequently appeared in the official media, especially in Komsomol
organs. Even Tsarist Russia and its conquests were sometimes lauded in
mass propaganda, including that directed to the non-Russians. 1 2 5
Representatives of minority groups were encouraged or required to accord the
Russians lavish praise and homage.126 Brezhnev himself. paid special
tribute to the Russian people, albeit in more understated fashion. He .
stressed the "special historical role" of the "great Russian people" and of
the Russian Republic in the development of the USSR and described the
RSFSR as the "first among equals" among the union republics. 1 2 7  It would
seem that the regime not only tolerated, but was actually encouraging the
growth of Russian national self-awareness and the expression of Russian
ethnocentrism. 128
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What may be of even greater significance, official policies on a number
of important issues were very similar to some of those advocated by Russian
nationalists. These issues include the demographic balance, the distribution
of political power, economic and administrative organization, resource
allocation, language policy, and minority rights and freedoms.
The regime cautiously took a number of steps to try to increase the
birthrate among Russians and reduce that of the Central Asians. In addition
to exhorting Russians to have more children, it encouraged scholarly
investigation of ways of promoting differentiated birthrates in different
republics and regions; announced a policy of encouraging two- and three-
child families, rather than larger ones, so as to equalize the birthrates of
the various republics and nations; and offered inducements to Central Asian
women to enter the labor force.1 2 9
The political power of Russians vis-a-vis other ethnic groups was
enlarged in the Brezhnev years. The proportion of second secretaries in the
non-Russian republics who are Russians is now higher than it was under
Khrushchev. Russian domination of the central government apparatus is now
even more complete than it was in the Stalin era. Even Ukrainians, to whom
Khrushchev allotted an important role at the center, have been increasingly
excluded from positions of power in the Kremlin.130 Control over the army,
in Khrushchev's day to a significant degree shared with the Ukrainians, is
now much more completely in Russian hands.131 Russian power has been
reinforced by a pronounced tendency in the Brezhnev period to concentrate
more and more economic decision-making in Moscow and establish greater
central control over all regions. 1 32
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There has likewise been a notable tendency to favor the RSFSR in the
allocation of investment resources. Almost from the very moment he came to
power Brezhnev began to urge that the Party devote more attention to the
agriculture of the large, long-neglected non-black earth zone of Central
Russia. His efforts bore fruit in the April, 1974 resolution of the Central
Committee and Council of Ministers to undertake a "total restructuring" of the
agricultural system of the region through massive land reclamation. As a
result of this decision, there was a significant slowdown in investment in
rural areas in other union republics. The growth in investment in the non-
black earth zone was at least twice as large as that in the USSR as a whole
during the llth five-year plan (1976-1980), while total agricultural spending
fell markedly in comparison to the previous plan period.133 Since the climate
in other areas, such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, is far milder and more
favorable for agriculture, the opportunity cost of this investment may have
been higher than the returns it will yield. Nonetheless, the regime has com-
mitted itself to invest heavily in this historic Russian heartland through at
least 1990'.134 Major investments were also made in Siberia throughout the
1970's, while diversion of Siberian rivers to poorly irrigated Central Asia
was repeatedly delayed. Higher priority was given to another diversion plan
which would benefit Russian agriculture.135 The ratio of total per capita
investment in the RSFSR to the mean for the other union republics increased
sharply in the period for which the comparison has been expertly computed
(1965-1975).136 Moreover, articles in the official press through the end of
the Brezhnev period indicated that the regime was prepared to take additional,
even more far-reaching measures to transfer resources from the non-Russian
peoples and republics to the Russians and the RSFSR.137
The nationality policy of the Brezhnev regime also resembled the
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preferences of Russian nationalists in some important respects. One of these
was the strong emphasis on linguistic Russification. In 1978 the Council of
Ministers secretly adopted a set of measures designed to greatly intensify and
accelerate the teaching of Russian to non-Russians. These measures were
reinforced by the recommendations of a major conference on the Russian
language held in Tashkent the following year. The new program extended
compulsory instruction in Russian down to the kindergarten level (instead of
the sixth grade) in the non-Russian republics and significantly increased the
time allocated to such instruction at all levels.138  The regime's
strong-handed approach to manifestations of local nationalism another
element in its policy which Russian nationalists have favored. The
leadership did not hesitate to use force to suppress demonstrations on behalf
of minority rights and freedoms and summarily dismissed republic Party
secretaries who displayed "laxity" in controlling such nationalism.13 9
The congruence between certain policies of the Brezhnev regime and some
of the demands and proposals of Russian nationalists does not by any means
indicate that the regime as a wholewas fully or even largely in agreement with
them. Itwasundoubtedly quite cognizant of the destablizing potential of
Russian nationalism and is therefore extremely wary of it. This is suggested
not only by the fact that the Politburo as a group and Brezhnev personally strong-
ly criticized some of the more explicit expressions of Russian nationalism,
but the additional fact that two full members of the Politburo, Polianskii and
Shelepin, were dismissed from that body apparently for too openly patronizing
Russian nationalists and promoting Russian national interests.1 4 0  Insofar
as the regime acted in accord with the spirit of Russian nationalist
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ideas, it clearly avoided extreme measures; it did not eliminate the
union republics or place new restrictions on their sovereignty; it did not
abolish the Council of Nationalities or remove all non-Russians from the
Politburo; it didnot cease to invest in non-Russian areas or withdraw
central government subsidies from minority cultural institutions and
programs; it didnot employ coercion or even strong incentives to try to
limit the Central Asian birthrate or prevent intermarriage of Russians and
others. Most important, it didnot abandon its public commitment to
internationalism -- i.e., to equal treatment and ultimate integration of all
national groups in the USSR. Moreover, even those of the regime's
policies which seem to reflect the views of Russian nationalists were not
necessarily adopted as a result of their influence or the impact of their
ideas. Each of these measures, if taken in isolation, could be ex-
plained on other grounds. 4 However, taken together, they do seem
to indicate a pattern of acceptance of key Russian nationalist arguments --
those regarding the importance of Russian demographic, political,
linguistic, and cultural dominance and the desirability of promoting the
economic prosperity of the Russian homeland. Given Brezhnev's own
ethnocentric pronouncements, it can probably be inferred that he was
to some extent personally sympathetic to or inclined to agreed with
these arguments. Well-informed observers believe that this was also
true of a significant number of his Politburo colleagues.142 Given
that an influential opponent of Russian nationalism was silenced
because of his excessive ardor; given, too, the regime's general tolerance
of Russian nationalism and efforts to ccopt and manipulate it, one can
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surely conclude that powerful members of the leadership, probably in-
cluding Brezhnev himself, saw both the need for making concessions to the
movement and even the utility of being identified with it to a limited
degree. Perhaps they hoped to contain and channel it, to prevent it
from becoming in its entirety what some of its members had already
become -- a frustrated, alienated opposition. Perhaps, too, they
hoped by associating themselves with it in measured ways to win a degree
of legitimacy in the eyes of their numerous Russian constituents which
their internationalist ideology had failed to gain for them.
Russian Nationalism and the Future of Soviet Politics
How much influence is Russian nationalism likely to have in the
future? Is its impact on policy likely to increase, remain at its present
level, or diminish? As was stated above, too little evidence can be
gleaned from Andropov's pronouncements and policy initiatives to give us a
good sense of his views on the subject. The meager evidence we do have
suggests that, like Brezhnev, the new Secretary General holds highly complex
and ambivalent opinions on the matter.143 On the one hand, he seems to be
extremely sensitive to the problems engendered by the existence of the
Russian nationalist movement and concerned to deflect minority hostility
away from the regime. On the other hand, he appears to be in agreement
with some of the more provocative Russian nationalist ideas and prepared
to make concessions to their proponents.144 It is not clear, however,
that his personal inclinations, even if one could gauge them, will be
decisive. Of at least equal significance for any effort to assess the
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probable future impact of Russian nationalism is an examination of the
strength of the movement within the political establishment, i.e.,
among the political elites who comprise the chief constituency of the
new leadership, whose opinions that leadership will be constrained and
inclined to heed, and from whom that leadership has been and will be
drawn. Also important to such an assessment is an analysis of the
factors which explain the appeal of Russian nationalism to those elites
and an evaluation of the likelihood that those factors will persist.
There is good a priori reason to assume that Russian nationalism
has won few enthusiasts among the Soviet political elite. One would
not expect that an ideology which rejects fundamental system-legitimizing
values would be attractive to those who represent the system, to
individuals and groups whose livelihood, status, and power -- perhaps
even physical survival -- depend on the preservation of that system.
Nor would one anticipate that the governors and administrators of the
USSR would readily embrace doctrines that are likely to antagonize
much of the population which will soon constitute a majority in the
country. Yet it is apparently no exaggeration to say that Russian
nationalism has permeated the entire political establishment. Knowledge-
able emigres report that its adherents are to be found in all major
institutions at all levels, and in all major groups within the establish-
ment. They maintain that the movement is so well organized that it
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is appropriate to describe it as a political party: the "Russian Party" is
the name that many nationalists themselves use. They assert that the
newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia is not only dominated by, but is in effect an
organ of this party, and the Society for the Preservation of Historical and
Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK) is the party's organizational base. 145
Although VOOPIK is bureaucratically a part of the Ministry of Culture,
each of its numerous local branches is reportedly headed by a KGB official.
For this reason the "Russian Party" is not only described as closely linked to
the KGB; the two organizations are depicted as coming increasingly to
overlap.146 It is not simply that the KGB wishes to control the movement, which
is surely true. Many police officials are apparently eager to encourage Russian
nationalism because they view its authoritarian and xenophobic tendencies as a
useful counter to pressures for liberalization, expansion of minority rights
and increased contact with the West. They see it, in other words, as a force
which, if potentially disruptive, can also help to promote order and
. .. .147discipline in Soviet society.
Russian nationalism also seems to be highly influential in those
organizations which not only share with the KGB responsibility for maintaining
order and discipline, but which also are charged with mobilizing, inspiring,
and socializing Soviet youth. These are the Komsomol, the paramilitary
voluntary society (DOSAAF), and the Main Political Administration of the Armed
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Forces (MPA).- The movement is openly supported at the highest levels in
these organizations; its adherents include the First Secretary of the
Komsomol, B.N. Pastukhov, many members of the Komsomol Central Committee, 1 4 9
and the head of the MPA, General A. Epishev.1 5 0  Russian nationalism is
regarded by officials who deal with youth as helpful in inducing participation
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in the large economic development projects which the regime periodically
'5'
launches. It is viewed as useful in encouraging patriotism, loyalty and
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devotion to the Soviet state and system.~ It is increasingly recognized
in official circles that Marxism-Leninism has failed to interest and excite
the younger generation, and that Russian nationalism can serve as a kind of
substitute ideology -- one which is capable of exploiting incomparably
deep-seated feelings and prejudices.1 5 3
This ideology appears to have numerous adherents in the military, too.
Some claim that Russian nationalist influence is confined to the ground
forces.1 5 4  However, other observers have found sympathy for and
interest in the movement in nearly all of the other branches. 155 There
is reason to think that Russian nationalist sentiments are widely held in the
officers' corps, which is almost entirely Russian (with a sprinkling of other
Slavs). In general, officer corps tend to be breeding grounds for
nationalist ideas, especially belief in the need for a strong state.
Moreover, an elite, socially segregated institution nearly all of whose
members belong to a single ethnic group would be likely to be susceptible to
an ideology which stresses the superiority of that ethnic group. In the
Soviet case in particular, the rise of China as a major (or the major)
military threat to the USSR appears to have encouraged the spread of Russian
nationalism, 156 and the military is thought to have been greatly concerned
about that threat. Members of the "Russian Party" are believed to include
some of the highest ranking generals, including the three First Deputy
Ministers of Defense (Marshalls Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief of the General
Staff; Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces; and
Sergei Sokolov, the First Deputy Minister for General Affairs), as well as
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former Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces,
Marshal Vasilii Chuikov. The latter was one of the founders of the Russian
national movement and the honorary chairman of VOOPIK.157 All of these
individuals are full members of the Central Committee. Their reported
Russian nationalist inclinations are explained by one observer as stemming at
least in part from their fear that, as a result of recent demographic trends,
non-Russians will penetrate the leadership of the military.158  Russian
nationalist doctrines would justify their desire to preserve the High Command
as a Russian bastion.
Substantial portions of the state and Party bureaucracies also seem to
have come under the sway of Russian nationalism.159 As one might expect,
the movement appears to be strongest in those sections concerned with the
affairs of the Russian Republic; the government apparatus and provincial and
city Party committees of the RSFSR. Officials of the RSFSR government
bureaucracy who are reputed to be Russian nationalists include the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the republic, Mikhail Solomentsev.160 A high
official in the Moscow City Party Committee, Vasilii Knotop, and many of the
RSFSR obkom secretaries have similarly been identified as strong supporters of
the "Russian Party," while Viktor Grishin, the First Secretary of the Moscow
City Party Committee and a full member of the Politburo, is described as a
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limited backer. Perhaps because they represent Russian areas and deal
exclusively with the problems of Russians, the officials who staff these
"Russian sections" apparently tend to see themselves as defenders of the
interests of the Russian people. In addition, the fact that they must win
the backing of Russians in order to implement the policy of the Party impels
them to promote Russian interests and advertise their behavior in
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nationalistic terms.162 What is probably most important, the personal
interests of these officials and the views of Russian nationalists often
tend to coincide, rendering the former natural allies of the latter. RSFSR
obkom secretaries, for example, are reportedly greatly concerned that
recent demographic, economic, and social developments are eroding their'
political base by depopulating the Russian countryside. They therefore
applaud Russian nationalist calls for measures to revive the Russian
village and promote the prosperity of Russian agriculture.1 6 3
It is not, however, only among officials responsible for Russian
affairs that Russian nationalism finds support. The appeal of the movement
appears to be quite strong among numerous Party officials whose work is
not specifically concerned with the RSFSR, but who are themselves of
Russian origin.164 There are indications, for example, that Russian
nationalist sympathizers occupy very high posts in the Central Committee
apparatus. Emigres who have had extensive contact with the Cultural
Division of the Central Committee describe the long-time head of that
division, M. Shauro, as a patron of the nationalists.165 There is
evidence that Ivan Kapitonov, the Central Committee secretary in charge
of the local Party committees, plays a similar role, as does candidate
Politburo member, Mikhail Solomentsev, who was a Central Committee
secretary before being appointed Premier of the RSFSR. Kapitonov and
Solomentsev were the only two Soviet leaders to participate in official
ceremonies in honor of the 600th anniversary of the Russian victory in the
Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, an event to which the nationalists attach
great importance.16 6
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It is difficult to know for sure just what it is that explains the
appeal of Russian nationalism for leaders and officials like these, whose
roles do not clearly impel them in that direction. Undoubtedly what is most
important for many is the sheer fact that they are themselves Russian and
hence share the anxieties, prejudices, and concerns which render many Russians
susceptible to nationalist doctrines. Like Russian military leaders and
obkom secretaries, they are surely aware of the unfavorable demographic trends
of recent years and may fear that these threaten the position of Russians in
the USSR.1 67 The rise of militant minority nationalism probably
exacerbates their fears, making them receptive to chauvinistic and xenophobic
doctrines. Dissident physicist Sakharov maintains that like some KGB
officials, many high-placed apparatchiki fear the results of detente and seek
in authoritarian nationalism an antidote to Western influence and its
potentially liberalizing impact. 168 They may also share with some military
leaders fear about the possibility (or inevitability) of armed conflict with
Chini and hence welcome the patriotic message of Russian nationalists..16 9
It may also be that the cohort of officials who are now assuming leadership
positions are more patriotic than Marxist-Leninist. Many of them joined the
Party during World War II, probably less out of ideological conviction than
the desire to serve their country in a time of exigency.1 7 0  However, one
suspects that for these officials, too, threat to personal interest is a major
reason for embracing Russian nationalism. It has been suggested that the
Russians who control the central Party and state apparatus are concerned that
impending loss of majority status will undermine the justification for the
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Russians' near-monopoly of political power and will thus make it necessary to
include more non-Russians in the leadership of the country. 1 7  Russian
nationalism apparently bolsters and rationalizes their determination to
maintain the political status quo and protect their individual and collective
positions.
At the same time, there is evidence of a widely felt need among Party
officials to strengthen their authority and the Party's by broadening the
basis of their legitimacy. Encouraging and identifying with Russian
nationalism may be a way of doing this. Underlying this strategy is
undoubtedly the consideration that the movement seems to have very broad
popular appeal, both actual and potential. An indication of this appeal is
the size of the membership of the Society for the Preservation of Historical
and Cultural Monuments, one of the few completely voluntary organizations in
the country. Although citizens are in no way pressured to join or rewarded
by the authorities for joining, more than 12 million had done so by the
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mid-1970's'. The estimated 50 million members of the Russian Orthodox
Church -- more than a third of the Russian population -- constitute an even
larger group which is widely regarded as being particularly sympathetic to
Russian nationalist ideas. Moreover, many knowledgeable observers
(probably including many Soviet officials) view most if not all of the entire
Russian population as potentially receptive to Russian nationalist
appeals. 17 If they are correct, that alone could account for sympathetic
interest in the movement on the part of those who govern and administer the
USSR.
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There is good reason to expect the influence of Russian nationalism to
increase in the foreseeable future. Most of the factors which explain its
appeal within the political establishment seem likely to become even more
salient. Given the Soviets' need for Western technology, which they
themselves acknowledge, links with and dependence on the West are likely to
grow. As they do, the desire for an antidote to this process will probably
become more intense and widespread. As the non-Russians become more
urbanized, their ethnic self-awareness and political militance are likely to
increase, generating a chauvinistic reaction among more and more Russians.
If economic problems become more acute and growth rates decline, as is widely
predicted, the need for a mobilizing tool will grow. If Soviet foreign
policy continues on an expansionist course -- as growing Soviet military might
will enable and encourage it to do -- international tensions will mount and
the need for a device to inspire patriotism will increase. The demographic
picture is certain to become even more unfavorable to the Russians, generating
among Russian commanders and politicians an even more intense need for an
ideology which will justify the exclusion of non-Russians from positions of
power. As Russian nationalists perceive these developments, their own
militance is likely to intensify. With every concession the regime makes to
them, their demands are likely to grow, increasing the pressure on the
leadership to grant them even more.
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It cannot be said that Russian nationalism faces no significent
opposition, that there are no important groups or trends against
which it must struggle. It seems clear that within the ranks of the
Party, especially the Party apparatus, there are numerous Marxist-Leninist
ideologues, sometimes described as "orthodox," "purist," or "fundamentalist,"
who view the doctrines of the Russian nationalists as a grave threat to
the very foundations of the Soviet system. These are principled inter-
nationalists,- who oppose the survival of the Russians as a distinct
ethnic group. They are located primarily in the Central Committee's
ideological and propaganda sections, which they control, and they are
well represented in the ranks of those whose function it is to supervise
and direct Soviet culture (e.g., Party organizers assigned to work among
intellectuals; Writers' Union officials; journal and newspaper editors; and
establishment literary critics). 1 7 5  Up to now, at any rate, they have by
no means been politically marginal; their leader and Politburo representative
for many years was the Party's chief ideologue, Mikhail Suslov, who is widely
regarded as having been one of the most powerful men in the country.176
They are believed to control the most authoritative Party organ,
.177
Kommunis t.
There are others who seem to oppose Russian nationalism as much or more
on pragmatic grounds as on principle. They apparently recognize its
destabilizing potential and/or view it as a major hindrance to the development
of what they regard as a vitally important cooperative relationship with the
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West. While they do not seem to constitute a coherent political group,
many of them occupy very high positions in the government and Party
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apparatus.
Some observers even contend that the influence of Russian nationalism
has declined since the early 1970's. The evidence cited for this assertion
is the more intense persecution from 1973 on of such nationalist dissidents
as Osipov, Solzhenitsyn, and other religious nationalists, and the removal
from the Politburo in 1973 of the nationalists' chief reputed patron,
Polianskii.179 It may be argued, however, that increased repression of
Russian nationalist dissidents does not constitute a move against Russian
nationalism per se. Rather, it reflects a growing determination on the
part of the regime to prevent any and all political activity outside the
supervision and control of the Party -- a constraint which these dissidents
did not accept. As for the dismissal of Polianskii, we have seen that
Russian nationalist influence has apparently penetrated the top leadership
through other supporters.
With regard to the future, one can almost certainly rule out the pre-
diction that the regime eventually will be completely controlled by Russian
nationalists and internationalism will be completely abandoned.180 This
seems very unlikely in view of the obvious utility of an internationalist
ideology in governing a multinational state. However, given the range of
powerful institutions in which Russian nationalists and their sympathizers
are well-entrenched; given, too, that the appeal of Russian
nationalism within the political establishment is likely to grow;
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one can expect that Russian nationalism will be a very significant political
force with even greater impact on policy in the years to come.
Conclusion
Russian nationalism has already become a destabilizing factor in Soviet
political life. It has led many Russians to reject key elements of official
ideology, to embrace alternative values opposed to those which legitimize the
system, and to condemn the system for its impact on the Russian people. It
has created fundamental divisions within the Soviet political elite. Most
important, it has apparently begun to influence the behavior of Russians and
the policies of the regime in ways that are deeply resented by non-Russians.
Yet although the influence of Russian nationalism is likely to increase,
and in so doing to have an even more destabilizing impact, this does not mean
that the collapse of or sudden radical change in the system is necessarily
imminent. However strong that influence may become, one can assume that
powerful forces will be at work which will counter, contain, and reduce its
destabilizing effects. Political scientists often stress that sheer
persistence over time, the demonstrated ability to overcome serious internal
and external challenges, tends to make a regime legitimate and hence stable.
This factor has been a very significant cause of regime legitimacy and
political stability in the USSR in the postwar period and is likely to remain
so. Equally important stabilizing factors, both in the past and in the
future, have been the leadership's firmness, political savvy, and will to
survive. Even a regime in which fervent Russian nationalists play a leading
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or dominant role is likely to be governed above all by its determination to
remain in power and its knowledge of what is necessary for that purpose. It
is likely to be even more unhesitating and thorough than the present one in
the suppression of dissent. Moreover, even a regime of this sort is likely
to recognize that extreme measures to implement a Russian nationalist program
could be dangerously provocative to non-Russians. For this reason, one may
expect that at least some residue of the current regime's concessionary and
compensatory nationality policy will persist, exerting a stabilizing
influence. A combination of firmness and pragmatism, in other words, is
likely to accompany and restrain ideological zeal. Under normal conditions,
this will probably be sufficient to dissuade minority elites and masses from
attempting the sort of massive and sustained violence which could lead to
revolutionary change.
What one can predict is that as the influence of Russian nationalism
grows, the Soviet system will move more and more toward the pole of
instability. There is likely to be a significant increase in the radicalism,
scale, and frequency of systemic dissent on the part of non-Russian elites,
and among ordinary non-Russians more frequent, more widespread instances of
sporadic mass protest, including violent protest, involving larger and larger
numbers of people.
The impact on the economy of greatly increased elite and mass
disaffection among the minorities may be very significant owing to widespread
passive resistance and indifference at the work place. At the same time, one
may well see a decline in productivity resulting from application of
non-rational or non-economic criteria in the allocation of investment, jobs,
and places in educational institutions. This will aggravate the negative
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effects of other serious problems and constraints expected to impinge on
economic performance in the coming decades. Without considering the probable
effects of Russian nationalist influence on policy, economists tend to concur
that a radical decline in the overall growth rate and the rate of growth of
per capita consumption will occur in the 1980's and possibly well
beyond.181 This decline is likely to compound the destabilizing impact of
Russian nationalism. It will make it harder for the authorities to sustain
the welfare colonialism which has been essential to political stability in the
past.
The regime's failure to reproduce the economic achievements of previous
decades may also promote discontent and disaffection among many Russians,
despite the appeal its more nationalistic program is likely to have for
them. Thus not only among the minorities, but on the part of Russians, too,
there may be a substantial increase in dissent, unrest, and violence. The
prospect of increased minority violence, sure to anger and incite many
Russians, makes such a possibility all the more likely.
Ethnic tensions are likely to become even more acute than they are now
or than they would be without the influence of the Russian nationalist
movement. One can expect to see the polarization of Soviet society along
ethnic lines, which is already occurring, to take place at a much faster rate
than it would have in the absence of Russian nationalist influence. It will
be much harder for the regime to control and govern such a society. Not only
will law and order be more difficult to maintain. Nearly all important
institutions can be expected to function less smoothly and efficiently, as it
will be harder for Russians and non-Russians to work well together. The army
will surely be affected, for in the coming decades it will have to absorb a
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much larger proportion of non-Slav recruits and place many of them in
hitherto all-Slav combat units. The state and Party apparatus, especially
in non-Russian areas, will suffer from increasing tension and hostility
between Russian and non-Russian officials and between Russian bureaucrats
and apparatchiki and the non-Russians they administer and supervise. All
this will reduce the regime's ability to handle the many economic and
other problems it will have to confront. Measures essential to the
welfare of society as a whole will be harder or impossible to implement,
since both Russians and non-Russians will veto moves which would require
cooperation or closer contact between them. 1 8 2
Finally, developments of the sort outlined above will make it much
harder for the regime to weather crises. Should there be a very sharp
economic downturn, accompanied by negative growth and decline in living
standards, or should the USSR become directly involved in a major war,
i.e.,'should the regime demonstrate an unusual degree of incompetence or
vulnerability, elite dissent and mass violence might reach such propor-
tions that they could not be controlled. They could well be transformed
into armed rebellion and sustained insurgency. A possible (although by
no means inevitable) outcome of such a process could even be political
collapse or radical political change.
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